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INTRODUCTION
Rach Parcell founded Pink Peonies in 2010 as a blog to document
her first year of marriage.1 Within three years, what had started as
mere hobby had rapidly grown into a full-fledged business.2 Today,
Parcell has over 16,300 followers on Twitter,3 over 98,000 “likes” on
Facebook,4 and over 931,000 followers on Instagram.5 Parcell lev-
erages the relationship she has built with her loyal followers to
generate income from affiliate links, sponsored posts, and her re-
cently launched clothing line.6 
Parcell is an “influencer.” Broadly defined, an influencer is any-
one who has the ability to impact someone’s purchase decisions.7 In
2014, Parcell earned over $960,000 just from sharing affiliate links;8
these links are specially coded to enable a brand to credit a con-
sumer’s purchase to an influencer and provide the influencer with
a commission based on the sale.9 Today, top influencers can make
six figures a month, or at least $1.2 million annually, solely from
affiliate links.10
1. Rach Parcell, About, PINK PEONIES, http://pinkpeonies.com/about/ [https://perma.cc/
T4S7-JRZX].
2. See id.
3. @rachparcell, TWITTER, https://twitter.com/rachparcell [https://perma.cc/9EVZ-E9VA].
4. Pink Peonies (@thepinkpeonies),F ACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/thepink peonies/
[https://perma.cc/ZU73-BUNS].
5. Rach Parcell (@rachparcell), INSTAGRAM, https://www.instagram.com/rachparcell/
[https://perma.cc/8T9H-BK3R].
6. See Parcell, supra note 1; see also Rachel Strugatz, The Blogosphere Pays off More than
Ever, WOMEN’S WEAR DAILY (Jan. 11, 2016), http://wwd.com/business-news/media/chiara-
ferragni-fashion-bloggers-money-make-income-millionaire-kristina-bazan-kylie-jenner-
10306124/ [https://perma.cc/8X9P-SQAK].
7. See Influencers, BUS. DICTIONARY, http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/
influencers.html [https://perma.cc/ATZ3-S9FN].
8. Rachel Strugatz & David Yi, Top Bloggers’ Incomes Approach New Heights, WOMEN’S
WEAR DAILY, June 12, 2014, at 1, 6. 
9. See Benjamin Edelman & Wesley Brandi, Risk, Information, and Incentives in Online
Affiliate Marketing, 52 J. MARKETING RES. 1, 2-3 (2015).
10. Rachel Strugatz, ShopStyle Banks on Bloggers, Relaunches Influencer Network,
WOMEN’S WEAR DAILY (June 10, 2015), http://wwd.com/business-news/media/shopstyle-
collective-bloggers-10145965/ [https://perma.cc/KYS6-4ZHS].
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Like Parcell, most influencers have built their followings by
sharing insights and images of their everyday lives.11 Initially,
influencers do not receive compensation for their posts; they
personally purchase the products they choose to promote.12 But as
an influencer’s following grows, so do the opportunities to generate
profits from brand “partnerships” and “collaborations,” as well as
from affiliate links.13 These profitable promotional opportunities,
regardless of their moniker, are considered endorsements that the
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) is empowered to regulate under
section 5 of the FTC Act.14 To protect consumers from deceptive
advertising practices, the FTC requires clear and conspicuous dis-
closure of an endorsement when there is a material relationship
between the influencer and the brand that a consumer might not
reasonably expect.15 Without clear and conspicuous disclosures of
these material relationships, consumers struggle to determine the
nature of the relationship between the influencer and the brand
promoted in any given post and to accurately evaluate how much
weight to give the influencer’s endorsement.16
The FTC Guides Concerning Use of Endorsements and Testimoni-
als in Advertising (the Guides) establish broad principles that
govern endorsement disclosure requirements and provide the FTC’s
interpretation of how section 5 of the FTC Act applies to the use of
endorsements in advertising.17 Other scholarship in this area
champions revisions to the Guides to further clarify when disclo-
sures are required and what constitutes an adequate disclosure.18
However, revisions are unnecessary because the Guides provide
detailed examples that demonstrate how the principles apply to a
11. See BRIAN SOLIS, THE INFLUENCER MARKETING MANIFESTO: WHY THE FUTURE OF
INFLUENCER MARKETING STARTS WITH PEOPLE AND RELATIONSHIPS NOT POPULARITY 1 (2016).
12. See id.
13. See Strugatz, supra note 6.
14. See 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1)(2) (2012); see also The FTC’s Endorsement Guides: What
People Are Asking, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/business-center/
guidance/ftcs-endorsement-guides-what-people-are-asking [https://perma.cc/9ME9-3BZV].
15. See 16 C.F.R. § 255.5 (2017).
16. See infra Part I.C.
17. See 16 C.F.R. § 255.0.
18. See, e.g., Leah W. Feinman, Note, Celebrity Endorsements in Non-Traditional
Advertising: How the FTC Regulations Fail to Keep up with the Kardashians, 22 FORDHAM
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 97, 137-42 (2011).
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wide range of endorsement situations.19 Moreover, the adaptability
of the Guides enables their application to endorsements across a
variety of new and emerging advertising platforms.20 The FTC has
even provided specific guidance confirming that influencers must
clearly and conspicuously disclose any endorsement compensated
through affiliate links.21 Yet, influencers do not disclose, and brands
do not require influencers to disclose, these relationships at an
alarming rate.22 To date, the FTC’s enforcement actions have failed
to effectively address the nondisclosure of endorsements in the
affiliate marketing industry because the FTC has generally limited
its enforcement power to discrete influencer marketing campaigns.23
Until 2017, the FTC made individual influencers seemingly in-
vincible by declining to pursue enforcement actions against them.24
Moreover, the FTC’s few attempts to enforce endorsement disclosure
requirements against individual influencers are insignificant in
comparison to the number of influencers that face no scrutiny.25
Notably, the FTC still has not pursued action against an individual
influencer for failing to properly disclose an endorsement in con-
nection with an affiliate link.26 And the practices of the affiliate net-
works—which comprise a $4.5 billion industry27—appear to have
escaped scrutiny, as they are entities distinct from any individual
marketing campaign or any particular brand.28 Therefore, to ef-
fectively protect consumers from deceptive affiliate marketing, the
FTC must pursue enforcement actions against individual influ-
encers and affiliate network companies for failing to clearly and
19. See, e.g., 16 C.F.R. § 255.0.
20. See, e.g., id.
21. FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 14.
22. See infra Part I.C.
23. See infra Part III.B.1.
24. See infra Part III.B.1. In 2017 the FTC brought its first complaint against individual
influencers for promoting their company in posts on YouTube and Twitter without “disclos-
[ing] they jointly owned the company.” See Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, CSGO Lotto
Owners Settle FTC’s First-Ever Complaint Against Individual Social Media Influencers (Sept.
7, 2017), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2017/09/csgo-lotto-owners-settle-ftcs-
first-ever-complaint-against [https://perma.cc/9RSM-AS8N].
25. See infra Parts I, IV.
26. See infra Part III.B.1.
27. See Strugatz, supra note 6.
28. See infra Part III.B.1.
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conspicuously disclose endorsements compensated through affiliate
links.
The FTC should leverage consent orders to set the industry stan-
dard for clear and conspicuous disclosures of affiliate links and ef-
fective influencer endorsement disclosure monitoring programs.29 To
protect its enforcement legitimacy, the FTC should avoid pursuing
enforcement mechanisms that would result in strict liability for any
failure to disclose an endorsement.30 The FTC should also increase
its outreach efforts to individual influencers to minimize endorse-
ment disclosure issues with up-and-coming influencers.31
Part I of this Note discusses the rise and appeal of influencer
marketing, which highlights the importance of enforcing endorse-
ment disclosure requirements to protect consumers from deceptive
advertising practices. Part II provides an overview of the FTC’s
deceptive advertising legal regime, explaining its application to
endorsement disclosures in the influencer and affiliate marketing
context. Part III explores the FTC’s prophylactic mission, enforce-
ment mechanisms, and enforcement discretion by examining how
the FTC exercises its enforcement discretion with respect to
influencer endorsements and affiliate marketing. Part IV proposes
the FTC pursue a multipronged enforcement approach to better pro-
tect consumers from influencers who fail to meet affiliate link dis-
closure requirements. This approach includes pursuing enforcement
actions against top influencers and affiliate marketing companies
and increasing engagement with the influencer community to
improve voluntary compliance with disclosure requirements.
I. INFLUENCER AND AFFILIATE MARKETING
The influencer marketing industry is growing exponentially, and
it shows no signs of slowing down. Affiliate marketing, a subset of
influencer marketing, enables brands to monitor the return on their
investment and reap the benefits of working with influencers to
promote their products. Together, the rise and appeal of influencer
29. See infra Part IV.C.
30. See infra Part IV.D.
31. See infra Part IV.E.
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marketing highlight the importance of the FTC enforcing endorse-
ment disclosure requirements.
A. The Rise of Influencer Marketing
An influencer is anyone “who ha[s] the power to affect purchase
decisions of others because of their (real or perceived) authority,
knowledge, position, or relationship.”32 This Note specifically focuses
on noncelebrity, professional influencers.33 These are individuals
who have developed loyal followings by sharing insights and images
from their everyday lives online.34 The FTC defines influencers as
endorsers because influencers provide “advertising message[s] ...
that consumers are likely to believe reflect[ ] the opinions, beliefs,
findings, or experiences of [the influencer, and not] the sponsoring
advertiser.”35
Endorsements from influencers are distinguishable from tradi-
tional celebrity endorsements. As ordinary people sharing their
everyday lives on social media, influencers are more relatable and
their endorsements are seemingly more authentic than endorse-
ments from traditional celebrities.36 An influencer’s endorsement is
often equivalent to a peer recommendation and can carry significant
weight with her followers.37
This “trusted voice speaking to their personal audience ... is the
most effective and organic exposure a brand can get.”38 One study
found that 49 percent of consumers rely on influencer recommenda-
tions when making purchasing decisions.39 Approximately 40 per-
cent had purchased an item after seeing an influencer endorsement
32. BUS. DICTIONARY, supra note 7.
33. Simply referred to as “influencers” throughout this Note.
34. See SOLIS, supra note 11, at 1.
35. 16 C.F.R. § 255.0(b) (2017).
36. See SOLIS, supra note 11, at 1.
37. See id.; see also NIELSEN, GLOBAL TRUST IN ADVERTISING: WINNING STRATEGIES FOR
AN EVOLVING MEDIA LANDSCAPE 4 (2015) (“In fact, two-thirds (66%) say they trust consumer
opinions posted online—the third-most-trusted format.”).
38. Paresh Dave, Firms Turn to Online ‘Influencers’ to Spread the Word on Social Media,
L.A. TIMES (Jan. 1, 2015, 4:23 PM), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-advertising-
disrupted-20150102-story.html [https://perma.cc/HPR4-RXZB].
39. Marty Swant, Twitter Says Users Now Trust Influencers Nearly as Much as Their
Friends, ADWEEK (May 10, 2016), http://www.adweek.com/news/technology/twitter-says-users-
now-trust-influencers-nearly-much-their-friends-171367 [https://perma.cc/6MN4-6NNK]. 
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on social media, and 20 percent had shared a product they learned
about from an influencer with their own friends and family.40
Accordingly, companies are increasingly diverting money from
traditional advertising and investing in the power of influencers.41 
Influencers often leverage their followings across multiple social
media platforms, including personal blogs, YouTube, Facebook,
Instagram, Twitter, and Snapchat.42 Influencers post over 200,000
sponsored images every month on Instagram, an image-based social
media platform.43 An influencer with three to seven million follow-
ers can earn on average $75,000 per Instagram post.44 An influencer
with one to five hundred thousand followers can earn on average
$5,000 per Instagram post.45 Compensation ranges from $2,000 to
$300,000 per post depending on the social media platform and the
influencer’s number of followers.46 Accordingly, top influencers have
the potential to earn between $1 million and $3 million per year
simply by sharing products through sponsored posts and affiliate
links.47 Even influencers with smaller followings can generate in-
come in the high six figures.48 This profitability allows many influ-
encers to pursue being an influencer as a full-time job.49
However, a large number of followers is not the same thing as
influence.50 Brands must carefully select influencers that can
40. Id.
41. See Dave, supra note 38; Christine Moorman, Social Media Spending Triples but Falls
Short of Expectations, FORBES (Aug. 23, 2016, 9:50 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/christine
moorman/2016/08/23/social-media-spending-triples-but-falls-short-of-expectations/#7bd5ab
357cff [https://perma.cc/VD3J-UTGJ].
42. See The Data Team, Celebrities’ Endorsement Earnings on Social Media, ECONOMIST
(Oct. 17, 2016), http://www.economist.com/blogs/graphicdetail/2016/10/daily-chart-9 [https://
perma.cc/JWT9-JQXN].
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Strugatz, supra note 6.
48. See Strugatz, supra note 10.
49. See id.
50. See SOLIS, supra note 11, at 4.
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convert views, likes, and shares into sales.51 Further, measuring
this conversion and return on investment is often hard to do.52
B. The Appeal of Affiliate Marketing
Affiliate marketing solves the challenge of ensuring a brand’s re-
turn on investment from sponsored social media posts. Instead of
paying a significant fee for a sponsored post that has no guarantee
of generating sales, a brand only pays an influencer when the in-
fluencer successfully generates a sale.53 The brand provides the
influencer with specially coded hyperlinks to share across her social
media platforms, and the influencer earns a commission each time
a consumer clicks the link shared by the influencer and completes
a purchase from the brand.54
Some brands manage their affiliate programs in-house, but most
brands work with an affiliate network (network)—a company that
brings together brands and influencers.55 Networks recruit brands
and influencers, generate the hyperlinks for influencers to share,
track brand and influencer performance, collect payments from
brands, and issue consolidated payments from multiple brands to
influencers.56 Networks also advise influencers on leveraging their
followings to maximize profit and direct influencers with regard to
permissible practices as a network member.57
51. See Yuyu Chen, Inside the Rocky, Love-Hate Relationship Between Marketers and
‘Influencers,’ DIGIDAY (May 9, 2016), http://digiday.com/brands/inside-rocky-love-hate-relation
ship-marketers-influencers/ [https://perma.cc/V88Y-EC9J].
52. See id.
53. See Edelman & Brandi, supra note 9, at 1.
54. See id. at 3. When the consumer clicks on the specially coded hyperlink, the link places
a “cookie” on the consumer’s computer. Id. at 4-5. The cookie enables the brand’s website to
recognize that the influencer referred the consumer to the brand through an affiliate link and
pay the influencer a commission if the consumer makes a purchase. Id. at 3-5.
55. See id. at 4. Amazon, eBay, and Apple all manage their affiliate programs in-house.
Id.
56. See id.
57. See id.; see also Francesca Mari, The Click Clique, TEX. MONTHLY (Sept. 2014),
http://www.texasmonthly.com/articles/the-click-clique/ [https://perma.cc/5RM4-MDTY] (“When
one popular rewardStyle blogger became so successful featuring outfits under $100 that she
was suddenly able to incorporate more-expensive clothing, [the network] quickly intervened.
‘All of a sudden, her earnings are going down with us .... So we had to say, “You’re not
converting whenever you show the Tibi or the McQueen or whatever else, because your reader
is only spending a hundred dollars or less online at any given time. You got rich, but your
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For brands and influencers in the fashion, beauty, and lifestyle
industries, rewardStyle is one of the premiere affiliate network
companies.58 In 2014, rewardStyle’s network of over 9000 influ-
encers and 4000 retailers generated $282 million in sales.59 Today,
rewardStyle’s network consists of over one million brands around
the world60 and has generated over $1 billion in sales since its
founding in 2011.61
RewardStyle has innovated beyond basic hyperlinks and pro-
vides influencers with embeddable widgets containing affiliate links,
which enable influencers to add an easily shoppable visual to their
blog posts.62 The network also developed LIKEtoKNOW.it to mon-
etize Instagram posts for influencers.63 Instagram allows influencers
to include the text of a web address in a post caption, but Instagram
does not make that text clickable and a consumer cannot quickly
use an affiliate link in one step if the consumer wants to purchase
a product from an influencer’s post.64 To circumvent this problem,
rewardStyle encourages consumers to sign up for LIKEtoKNOW.
it.65 When the consumer “likes” an Instagram post that an influ-
encer created according to LIKEtoKNOW.it’s specifications, re-
wardStyle sends the consumer an email containing affiliate links to
the products shared in the Instagram post.66 As with affiliate links
that influencers share on other platforms, LIKEtoKNOW.it mini-
mizes the number of steps a consumer must take to shop the
products an influencer has endorsed, while also turning a profit for
the influencer, network, and brand. In the first nine months of
readers didn’t.”’”).
58. See Mari, supra note 57.
59. Elizabeth Holmes, How Style Bloggers Earn Sales Commissions, One Click at a Time,
WALL ST. J. (Feb. 11, 2015, 11:33 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/how-style-bloggers-earn-
sales-commissions-one-click-at-a-time-1423693911 [https://perma.cc/LRG8-A95N].
60. REWARDSTYLE, https://www.rewardstyle.com [https://perma.cc/MX5R-NK3C].
61. Jordan Crook, RewardStyle Helps Influencers Make Money from Social, TECHCRUNCH
(May 6, 2016), https://techcrunch.com/2016/05/06/rewardstyle-helps-influencers-make-money-
from-social/ [https://perma.cc/EK7M-AUJ2].
62. Holmes, supra note 59.
63. Id.
64. See id.
65. See id.
66. Id.
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LIKEtoKNOW.it’s operation, rewardStyle generated $10 million in
sales.67
For influencers, affiliate links are a significant revenue stream.68
This is remarkable because, of the consumers who click on an af-
filiate link, only 1 or 2 percent make a purchase and only 3 percent
of purchases include the exact item from the affiliate link.69
Nonetheless, these profits are possible because affiliate links enable
influencers to earn a commission on a consumer’s entire purchase.70
Commissions range from 3 to over 20 percent,71 and rewardStyle’s
average commission is 13 percent.72 A top influencer can generate
well over $1.2 million in annual revenue from affiliate links alone.73
Affiliate marketing is a rapidly growing industry, and experts pro-
jected that brands would spend $4.5 billion on affiliate marketing
in 2016.74
C. The Importance of Endorsement Enforcement in Influencer
Marketing
The FTC requires influencers to disclose any material connection
between themselves and a brand that consumers might not rea-
sonably expect.75 These disclosures are necessary to ensure consum-
ers can accurately evaluate and give appropriate weight to an
influencer’s endorsement.76 Consumers view influencers as their
peers, and will give the same high-level of value to a fashion influ-
encer’s opinion as they would to a best friend that goes shopping
with them.77 A best friend’s endorsement of a particular pair of
shoes will typically be independent of any material relationship
with the brand. In contrast, the employee who assists the consumer
in a store clearly has a relationship with the brand. The consumer
67. Id.
68. See Strugatz, supra note 6.
69. Mari, supra note 57.
70. See id.
71. Holmes, supra note 59.
72. Mari, supra note 57.
73. Strugatz, supra note 10.
74. Strugatz, supra note 6.
75. See 16 C.F.R. § 255.5 (2017).
76. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 14.
77. See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
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will be wary of placing as much value on the employee’s opinion be-
cause the consumer knows that the economic benefit that comes
from making the sale motivates the employee’s endorsement.
Without clear and conspicuous disclosures of material relationships,
a consumer cannot effectively determine whether an influencer’s
endorsement should be given the weight of a trusted friend or of a
brand’s employee.78
Despite disclosure requirements, just over half of brands require
influencers to disclose material connections,79 and one in four
influencers report that brands have specifically asked them not to
disclose their material connection to the brand.80 Market forces
alone are unlikely to correct this deceptive advertising practice,
because clear and conspicuous disclosures jeopardize the inherent
power of influencers by revealing that what a consumer perceives to
be a peer recommendation is actually a paid advertisement.81 Thus,
effective FTC enforcement of endorsement disclosure requirements
in influencer marketing is critical to preventing consumer deception
and enabling consumers to make informed purchasing decisions.
Effective enforcement will also benefit brands and influencers, who
stand to lose essential credibility when consumers discover the ex-
tent of their nondisclosures and feel betrayed by what they once
thought was an “authentic and trustworthy” voice.82
II. THE CURRENT DECEPTIVE ADVERTISING LEGAL REGIME AND
DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS
The FTC’s deceptive advertising legal regime applies to endorse-
ment disclosures in the influencer and marketing context. An over-
view of the FTC’s deceptive advertising legal regime provides the
78. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 14.
79. SOLIS, supra note 11, at 16.
80. Lindsay Stein, One in Four Influencers Asked Not to Disclose Paid Promotion, ADAGE
(Aug. 10, 2016), http://adage.com/article/cmo-strategy/influencers-asked-disclose-arrangement/
305389/ [https://perma.cc/UBH4-7KPP].
81. See SOLIS, supra note 11, at 1.
82. Thomas Harvey, Marketing Your Brand with Influencers? Make Sure the FTC Hits the
“Like” Button, RECORDER (Sept. 26, 2016, 10:57 AM), http://www.therecorder.com/id=12027
68022029/Marketing-Your-Brand-With-Influencers-Make-Sure-the-FTC-Hits-the-Like-
Button?slreturn=20170830173158 [https://perma.cc/XQL6-Z9WE].
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foundation for understanding the FTC’s endorsement disclosure re-
quirements for influencers, brands, and intermediaries.
A. The FTC’s Deceptive Advertising Framework
Section 5 of the FTC Act empowers the FTC to require influencers
disclose affiliate links through its mandate “to prevent persons,
partnerships, or corporations ... from using ... unfair or deceptive
acts or practices in or affecting commerce.”83 The FTC Act does not
define “deceptive acts or practices.”84 Thus, the FTC has issued a
policy statement outlining its interpretation of “deception.”85 This
policy statement guides the FTC’s enforcement regime.86
The FTC defines deception as “a representation, omission or
practice that is likely to mislead the consumer acting reasonably in
the circumstances, to the consumer’s detriment.”87 An omission is
deceptive when (1) the “information necessary to prevent a ...
reasonable expectation or belief from being misleading is not
disclosed,”88 and (2) “consumers are likely to have chosen differently
but for the deception.”89 An omission is deceptive when it is “likely
to mislead reasonable consumers under the circumstances. The test
is whether the consumer’s interpretation or reaction is reason-
able.”90 An omission is sufficiently deceptive as long as it misleads
“a significant minority” of reasonable consumers.91 The Sixth Circuit
has affirmed that a “significant minority” can be as few as 10
83. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2) (2012) (emphasis added).
84. See id. § 45. The FTC Act defines “false advertising” with respect to regulating the
advertising of “food, drugs, devices, services, or cosmetics” under 15 U.S.C. § 52. See id.
§ 55(a)(1) (“[A]n advertisement, other than labeling, which is misleading in a material re-
spect.”).
85. See Letter from James C. Miller III, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm’n, to the Honorable
John D. Dingell, Chairman, Comm. on Energy & Commerce, U.S. House of Representatives
(Oct. 14, 1983) [hereinafter FTC POLICY STATEMENT ON DECEPTION], appended to Cliffdale
Assocs., Inc., 103 F.T.C. 110 app. at 174 (1984).
86. See ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, FTC PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE MANUAL 26-28
(2d ed. 2014).
87. See FTC POLICY STATEMENT ON DECEPTION, supra note 85, at app. at 176.
88. Id. at app. at 175 n.4; see also Aronberg v. FTC, 132 F.2d 165, 167 (7th Cir. 1942)
(“The ultimate impression upon the mind of the reader arises from the sum total of not only
what is said but also of all that is reasonably implied.”).
89. FTC POLICY STATEMENT ON DECEPTION, supra note 85, at app. at 176.
90. Id. at app. at 177 (footnote omitted).
91. Id. at app. at 177 n.20.
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percent of reasonable consumers.92 This definition of deception does
not require the FTC to prove actual deception93 or an intent to de-
ceive.94
The Guides elaborate on the application of these principles in the
context of the use of endorsements and testimonials in advertising.95
Although the Guides are promulgated under the FTC’s rulemaking
authority,96 they are distinct from trade regulation rules.97 Thus, the
Guides provide only “the general principles that the Commission
will use in evaluating endorsements and testimonials,” and
compliance with those principles is voluntary, not compulsory.98
The Guides define an endorsement as “any advertising message
... that consumers are likely to believe reflects the opinions, beliefs,
findings, or experiences of a party other than the sponsoring adver-
tiser.”99 An endorser is “[t]he party whose opinions, beliefs, findings,
or experience the message appears to reflect ... and may be an
individual, group, or institution.”100 To prevent an endorsement from
being deceptive, the Guides require disclosure of any “connection
between the endorser and the seller of the advertised product that
might materially affect the weight or credibility of the endorsement
92. See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. FTC, 481 F.2d 246, 249 (6th Cir. 1973) (affirming
the FTC’s finding of deception when the ad “misled 15% (or 10%) of the buying public”).
93. See FTC POLICY STATEMENT ON DECEPTION, supra note 85, at app. at 176 (“The issue
is whether the act or practice is likely to mislead, rather than whether it causes actual decep-
tion.”).
94. See Regina Corp. v. FTC, 322 F.2d 765, 768 (3d Cir. 1963) (“Proof of petitioner’s
intention to deceive is not a prerequisite to a finding of a violation, it is sufficient that
deception is possible.” (citation omitted)).
95. See 16 C.F.R. § 255.0(a) (2017).
96. See 15 U.S.C. § 57a(a)(1)(A) (2012) (“[T]he Commission may prescribe ... interpreta-
tive rules and general statements of policy with respect to unfair or deceptive acts or practices
in or affecting commerce.”).
97. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION: LAW, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 13.01 (2017) (“Guides,
enforcement policy statements and interpretations are not conclusive legally on the issue of
whether the law has been violated, but they do inform the public about the Commission’s
enforcement intentions and the likely outcome of a proceeding involving the issues covered.
On the other hand, trade regulation rules constitute a statement of the law, and the legality
of the prohibited conduct ceases to be an issue to be litigated in an enforcement action.”
(citations omitted)).
98. 16 C.F.R. § 255.0(a).
99. Id. § 255.0(b) (emphasis added).
100. Id.
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(i.e., the connection is not reasonably expected by the audience).”101
All disclosures must be made “clearly and conspicuously.”102
Although the Guides repeatedly state that all disclosures must be
made “clearly and conspicuously,” the Guides do not define this
standard.103 The FTC has issued additional guidance to clarify how
this standard applies.104
In evaluating whether a disclosure is likely to be clear and
conspicuous, advertisers should consider its placement in the ad
and its proximity to the relevant claim.... Additional consider-
ations include: the prominence of the disclosure; whether it is
unavoidable; whether other parts of the ad distract attention
from the disclosure; whether the disclosure needs to be repeated
at different places on a website; ... and whether the language of
the disclosure is understandable to the intended audience.105
With respect to proximity and placement, this framework requires
that disclosures are “effectively communicated to consumers before
they make a purchase or incur a financial obligation.”106 The FTC
considers all of these factors together to determine whether “the
overall net impression of the ad” is misleading to a reasonable
consumer.107
These general principles are adaptable and intended to be ap-
plied on a case-by-case basis.108 Ultimately, “[l]iability as an endors-
er turns on whether a consumer would reasonably attribute the
101. Id. § 255.5. The FTC can require influencers to clearly and conspicuously disclose
material relationships because the First Amendment does not protect misleading commercial
speech. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 563 (1980).
102. 16 C.F.R § 255.5.
103. See id. §§ 255.0, 255.5.
104. See, e.g., FED. TRADE COMM’N, .COM DISCLOSURES: HOW TO MAKE EFFECTIVE DIS-
CLOSURES IN DIGITAL ADVERTISING (2013), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/plain-
language/bus41-dot-com-disclosures-information-about-online-advertising.pdf [https://perma.
cc/4HLH-L46W].
105. Id. at i-ii.
106. Id. at 14 (emphasis added); see also FTC POLICY STATEMENT ON DECEPTION, supra note
85, at app. at 180 (“Thus, when the first contact between a seller and a buyer occurs through
a deceptive practice, the law may be violated even if the truth is subsequently made known
to the purchaser.”).
107. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 104, at 6. 
108. 16 C.F.R. § 255.0(a) (“Whether a particular endorsement or testimonial is deceptive
will depend on the specific factual circumstances of the advertisement at issue.”). 
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views, opinions, or beliefs expressed as personal to the speaker or
merely as those of the sponsoring advertiser.”109 Because this
framework is context dependent, it is flexible enough to be applied
across the broad spectrum of existing and emerging advertising
platforms—including influencer marketing.110
The Guides offer several examples that specifically demonstrate
how these principles apply to influencers.111 In one example, the
influencer must disclose that she received a product for free through
a network marketing program.112 Even though the influencer’s
decision to write a review on her personal blog is voluntary, this
post is an endorsement and she must disclose it because her receipt
of the product for free is a material connection that her readers
might not reasonably expect.113 In another example, disclosure is
similarly required when an influencer receives a video game system
for free from the manufacturer in exchange for posting a review of
the product on his personal blog.114 Again, the influencer’s relation-
ship to the brand is not obvious to consumers without a disclo-
sure.115 Furthermore, these examples demonstrate that the nature
of the relationship between the influencer and the brand—in which
the brand gave the influencer something of value—is a fact that is
likely to have a significant impact on how much weight and
credibility a consumer gives to the influencer’s endorsement.116
The examples in the Guides also highlight that the influencer
and the advertiser are both responsible for ensuring that the
material relationship is clearly and conspicuously disclosed with the
endorsement.117 One example expressly imputes liability to an
109. FTC v. Garvey, No. CV 00-9358 (GAF)(CWx), 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25060, at *18
(C.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 2001).
110. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 104, at 2-4.
111. See 16 C.F.R. §§ 255.0 ex. 8, 255.1 ex. 5, 255.5 ex. 7.
112. Id. § 255.0 ex. 8.
113. Id.; see id. § 255.5.
114. Id. § 255.5 ex. 7.
115. Id.
116. See id. §§ 255.0 ex. 8, 255.5 ex. 7.
117. See id. § 255.5 ex. 7 (“Accordingly, the blogger should clearly and conspicuously dis-
close that he received the gaming system free of charge. The manufacturer should advise him
at the time it provides the gaming system that this connection should be disclosed, and it
should have procedures in place to try to monitor his postings for compliance.”); see also id.
§ 255.1(d) (“Advertisers are subject to liability for ... failing to disclose material connections
between themselves and their endorsers. Endorsers also may be liable for statements made
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influencer “if she fails to disclose clearly and conspicuously that she
is being paid for her services.”118 Moreover, an advertiser must
monitor the influencers it works with to ensure that those influ-
encers make clear and conspicuous endorsement disclosures.119
When an advertiser discovers deficient or nonexistent disclosures,
the advertiser must “take steps necessary to halt the continued
publication of deceptive representations.”120 The advertiser cannot
escape liability for the influencer’s deceptive representations or
omissions by employing an advertising service to develop and
administer the advertising campaign.121 As Mary Engle, Associate
Director for Advertising Practices at the FTC, has emphasized, the
advertiser’s duty to monitor extends to “all third-party marketing
affiliates that may endorse or promote a brand.”122 
B. Disclosure Requirements for Affiliate Links
An influencer’s use of an affiliate link is an endorsement that
requires clear and conspicuous disclosure of the relationship
between the influencer and the advertiser. By broadly defining
endorsements to include “any advertising message,” the FTC en-
sured that regulations governing endorsements would extend to new
and nontraditional forms of advertising.123 New and nontraditional
forms of advertising—such as affiliate marketing—are endorse-
ments when “consumers are likely to believe [the advertising mes-
sage] reflects the opinions, beliefs, findings, or experiences of a
party other than the sponsoring advertiser.”124 Affiliate links are
endorsements because an influencer’s followers are likely to at-
tribute the influencer’s recommendation of a product and inclusion
in the course of their endorsements.”).
118. Id. § 255.1 ex. 5.
119. Id.
120. Id. 
121. See id. (“In order to limit its potential liability, the advertiser should ensure that the
advertising service provides guidance and training to its bloggers concerning the need to
ensure that statements they make are truthful and substantiated.”).
122. Anthony DiResta et al., Holland & Knight LLP, Regulators and Industry Thought
Leaders Discuss Issues in Social Media Advertising—Highlights from “The FTC, Native
Advertising and Consumer Privacy,” JD SUPRA (Sept. 29, 2016), http://www.jdsupra.com/legal
news/regulators-and-industry-thought-leaders-22009/ [https://perma.cc/7UMW-SPV6].
123. 16 C.F.R. § 255.0(b) (emphasis added).
124. Id. (emphasis added).
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of a link to purchase that product to the influencer, not the brand.125
Further, the FTC requires clear and conspicuous disclosure of any
connection between influencers and brands “that might materially
affect the weight or credibility of the endorsement.”126 Therefore, an
influencer must clearly and conspicuously disclose her use of an af-
filiate link because the link allows both the influencer and the
brand to profit from an influencer’s personal recommendation to her
followers that a particular product is worth purchasing, and that
connection may materially affect the weight a consumer gives to the
influencer’s endorsement.127
 In its May 2015 publication, The FTC’s Endorsement Guides:
What People Are Asking, the FTC confirmed that it requires in-
fluencers to clearly and conspicuously disclose any endorsement
compensated through affiliate links.128 The FTC reiterated that the
influencer should place the disclosure as close to the endorsement
as possible, and that the influencer must include the disclosure each
time she shares an affiliate link on any platform.129 The FTC
indicated that “affiliate link” by itself would likely not be an ade-
quate disclosure because “[c]onsumers might not understand that
‘affiliate link’ means that the person placing the link is getting paid
for purchases through the link.”130 Instead, the FTC recommended
influencers state, “I get commissions for purchases made through
links in this post.”131
The FTC also rejected the argument that it might be common
knowledge that influencers receive payment for promoting products
and make commissions from the links on their websites.132 The FTC
reasoned that it is immaterial that a majority of consumers might
be aware of these practices because any omission “that misleads a
125. See  FED. TRADE COMM’N, THE FTC’S ENDORSEMENT GUIDES: WHAT PEOPLE ARE
ASKING 18 (2015)  [https://perma.cc/34JB-X2XG]; see also FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 14
(updating The FTC’s Endorsement Guides: What People Are Asking with answers to new
questions in September 2017).
126. 16 C.F.R. § 255.5.
127. See Mari, supra note 57.
128. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 14.
129. See id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
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significant minority of reasonable consumers is deceptive.”133
Similarly, distinctions between a personal blog and a full-time
influencer’s blog are immaterial, because in either instance it is
likely that a significant minority of reasonable consumers might
not be aware that the influencer is receiving commissions from the
links on her website absent a disclosure.134
In accordance with the Guides, the influencer is responsible for
clearly and conspicuously disclosing that she earns a commission
from an affiliate link, and the brand is responsible for implementing
a monitoring program to ensure adequate disclosures accompany an
influencer’s affiliate link.135 The FTC has affirmatively stated that
pursuing an enforcement action against an individual influencer for
endorsement disclosure violations “might be appropriate in certain
circumstances, such as if the endorser has continued to fail to make
required disclosures despite warnings.”136 Nevertheless, the FTC
has stated that it is generally not actively monitoring individual
influencers for insufficient and nonexistent endorsement disclo-
sures.137 The FTC will evaluate, on a case-by-case basis, any con-
cerns brought to its attention about a particular influencer’s insuf-
ficient or nonexistent endorsement disclosures.138
The FTC generally focuses its enforcement efforts in this area on
brands and their advertising agencies.139 Brands cannot avoid
liability by delegating all or part of a promotional program to an
outside entity.140 Additionally, the FTC will hold advertising agen-
cies that pay and direct influencers responsible for the inadequate
and nonexistent endorsement disclosures of those influencers.141
These intermediaries, like brands, are responsible for educating
influencers on adequate disclosures and implementing a reasonable
133. FTC POLICY STATEMENT ON DECEPTION, supra note 85, at app. at 177 n.20 (emphasis
added); see also FED TRADE COMM’N, supra note 14.
134. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 14.
135. See supra notes 117-19 and accompanying text.
136. FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 14.
137. See id.
138. See id.; see also infra Part IV.A (discussing the FTC’s issuance of warning letters to
Instagram influencers in response to letters from Public Citizen and Truth in Advertising).
139. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 14.
140. See id.; see also supra notes 121-22 and accompanying text.
141. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 14.
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monitoring program to ensure influencers make adequate disclo-
sures.142
III. THE FTC’S ENFORCEMENT REGIME
The FTC has a variety of enforcement mechanisms available to
address an influencer’s failure to clearly and conspicuously disclose
that she earns a commission from an affiliate link. In accordance
with the FTC’s consumer protection mission, these enforcement
mechanisms are intended to be exercised in a preventative, not pun-
itive, manner.143 Thus, the prevention of future violations is the
primary focus of each enforcement action.144
Additionally, the FTC must exercise its enforcement discretion
strategically to maximize its limited resources.145 This enforcement
discretion includes the consideration of the number of consumers
potentially deceived, the degree of physical or economic harm, the
incentives for brands to employ a particular deceptive practice, and
the likelihood that market forces will correct that practice.146
Because the FTC addresses enforcement on a case-by-case basis,147
the FTC’s influencer endorsement enforcement actions provide
insight that is critical to understanding when and how the FTC’s
endorsement mechanisms can be used to prevent consumer de-
ception.
142. See id.
143. See JEF I. RICHARDS, DECEPTIVE ADVERTISING: BEHAVIORAL STUDY OF A LEGAL
CONCEPT 12 (1990). Section 5 of the FTC Act empowers the FTC “to prevent persons,
partnerships, or corporations ... from using ... unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or
affecting commerce.” 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2) (2012) (emphasis added).
144. See infra Part III.B.
145. The FTC received over three million consumer complaints in 2015. Stats & Data 2015,
FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/node/943403 [https://perma.cc/692M-FKJP]. In con-
trast, it only exercised its prosecutorial discretion to file 107 actions and obtain 178 orders.
Id. During this same time period, the FTC was operating on a $293 million budget with 1144
full-time employees, split between its consumer protection and competition promotion
missions. FTC Appropriation and Full-Time Equivalent (FTE) History, FED. TRADE. COMM’N,
https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/bureaus-offices/office-executive-director/financial-management-
office/ftc-appropriation [https://perma.cc/J9MH-N47F]; see also Human Capital Management
Office, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/bureaus-offices/office-executive-
director/human-capital-management-office [https://perma.cc/K5F9-JRXW].
146. See RICHARDS, supra note 143, at 17-19; see also FTC POLICY STATEMENT ON DE-
CEPTION, supra note 85, at app. at 180-81, 180 nn.36-37.
147. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 14.
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A. The FTC’s Enforcement Mechanisms
The FTC has broad investigative authority that provides the basis
for its enforcement mechanisms.148 This investigative authority
empowers the FTC “[t]o gather and compile information concerning,
and to investigate from time to time the organization, business,
conduct, practices, and management of any person, partnership, or
corporation engaged in or whose business affects commerce.”149
Through its far-reaching investigative authority, the FTC can re-
quire individuals and brands to submit reports responding to
specific questions.150 The FTC can use this reporting mechanism
independently from a law enforcement action to gather nonpublic
data on particular business practices and develop responsive policy
recommendations.151
Opening an investigation into whether an advertiser has engaged
in a deceptive practice is the FTC’s first step toward any enforce-
ment action.152 An investigation can be initiated “upon the request
of the President, Congress, governmental agencies, or the Attorney
General; upon referrals by the courts; upon complaint by members
of the public; or by the Commission upon its own initiative.”153 The
launch of an investigation does not guarantee that the FTC will
pursue an enforcement action.154
The FTC may resolve a pending investigation by closing the
investigation, seeking a consent order, or issuing a complaint.155
When the FTC closes an investigation, it may issue a public closing
letter indicating that the FTC is not recommending enforcement
action.156 Closing letters do not provide a determination as to
148. See A Brief Overview of the Federal Trade Commission’s Investigative and Law
Enforcement Authority, FED. TRADE COMM’N (July 2008), https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/what-
we-do/enforcement-authority [https://perma.cc/DV35-FNU8]; see also 15 U.S.C. § 43 (2012)
(“The Commission may ... prosecute any inquiry necessary to its duties.”).
149. 15 U.S.C. § 46(a).
150. See id. § 46(b).
151. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 148.
152. See ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 86, at 183.
153. 16 C.F.R. § 2.1 (2017).
154. See ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 86, at 195.
155. Id.
156. See, e.g., Letter from Charles A. Harwood, Reg’l Dir., Fed. Trade Comm’n, to Yaron
Dori, Counsel, Microsoft Corp., & Amy R. Mudge, Counsel, Starcom MediaVest Grp. (Aug. 26,
2015) [hereinafter Microsoft and Starcom Letter], https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/
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whether a violation has occurred, and the FTC reserves the right to
take further action on the matter in the future.157 The FTC and an
advertiser may enter into a consent order before or after the FTC
issues a complaint.158 A consent order allows the advertiser to settle
deception allegations, often without admitting liability, and waives
any right to judicial review.159 An advertiser is liable for a civil
penalty of up to $40,000 for each violation of a consent order.160
Following an investigation, the FTC can bring a case directly in
federal court.161 To enforce any civil penalty or seek consumer
redress, the FTC must pursue litigation in court.162 The FTC may
elect to challenge a deceptive or unfair practice directly in court by
seeking preliminary and permanent injunctions.163 Judicial en-
forcement is advantageous because “the court may award both pro-
hibitory and monetary equitable relief in one step” and “a judicial
injunction becomes effective immediately.”164
Alternatively, when the FTC issues a complaint and the adver-
tiser contests the allegations, the parties may proceed with an
administrative trial and an administrative law judge will recom-
mend either entering a cease and desist order or dismissing the
complaint.165 An advertiser is liable for a civil penalty of up to
$40,000 for each violation of a cease and desist order.166 After all
judicial review of a cease and desist order is complete, the FTC may
seek relief for consumers by filing a civil action in federal court
against the advertiser.167
Once a cease and desist order is final, the FTC can hold a
nonparty liable for committing a deceptive act that violates the
order.168 The FTC can collect a civil penalty from the nonparty,
provided the FTC can prove that it had placed the nonparty on
closing_letters/nid/150902machinima_letter.pdf [https://perma.cc/3QKD-4TQZ].
157. See, e.g., id. at 2.
158. See ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 86, at 196.
159. FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 148.
160. See 16 C.F.R. § 1.989(c) (2017).
161. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 148.
162. Id.
163. See id.; see also 15 U.S.C. § 53(b) (2012).
164. FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 148.
165. Id.
166. 15 U.S.C. § 45(m)(1)(B) (2012); 16 C.F.R. § 1.98(e) (2017).
167. See 15 U.S.C. § 57b(a)(2); see also FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 148.
168. See 15 U.S.C. § 45(m)(1)(B); FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 148.
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notice by providing the nonparty with a copy or synopsis of the
order.169 A similar strict liability enforcement mechanism is
available through the FTC’s administrative rulemaking power.170
Rulemaking enables the FTC to address deceptive practices in a
particular industry by identifying specific acts and practices that it
considers to be deceptive.171 The FTC can hold a party strictly liable
for a civil penalty of up to $40,000 for each violation of an adminis-
trative rule provided the party had “actual knowledge or knowledge
fairly implied ... that such act ... is prohibited.”172 Regardless of a
party’s knowledge, the FTC can hold a party strictly “liable for in-
jury caused to consumers by [a] rule violation.”173
The FTC also has a variety of opportunities to promote voluntary
compliance through outreach and engagement with stakeholders.174
“Surfs” are one such opportunity.175 The FTC collaborates with law
enforcement agencies on organized surfs of the Internet to identify
instances of deceptive advertising practices.176 Following a surf, the
FTC issues warning letters to the individuals and companies that
were found to be using potentially deceptive advertising practices.177
A warning letter identifies the questionable practice, explains the
applicable law, and provides an opportunity for the individual or
company to voluntarily comply with the law.178
Public outreach mechanisms include disseminating business
and consumer education publications and working papers, hosting
public workshops and seminars, and giving speeches at industry
169. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 148.
170. See id.
171. See 15 U.S.C. § 57a(a)(1)(B); FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 148. Recall that the
Guides are promulgated under this authority, but are distinct from and do not carry the same
weight as trade regulation rules. See supra notes 96-98 and accompanying text.
172. 15 U.S.C. § 45(m)(1)(A); 16 C.F.R. 1.98(d) (2017).
173. FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 148 (“The Commission may pursue such recovery in
a suit for consumer redress under Section 19 of the FTC Act.”).
174. William E. Kovacic, The Federal Trade Commission as Convenor: Developing Reg-
ulatory Policy Norms Without Litigation or Rulemaking, 13 COLO. TECH. L.J. 17, 19 (2015)
(“Congress gave the FTC capacity to serve as a convenor—to engage in a diverse array of
activities that facilitate norms development.”).
175. See ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 86, at 220.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. See id.
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conferences.179 Through workshops and seminars, the FTC convenes
academics, industry representatives, and consumer advocates to
discuss regulatory concerns and potential solutions.180 By creating
a forum for stakeholders to engage in a productive discourse, these
workshops and seminars provide the FTC with invaluable informa-
tion to further “its policymaking and enforcement efforts” and raise
the profile of significant regulatory issues.181 These workshops have
also led to substantive staff or FTC reports.182
The FTC also leverages its social media presence, in a similar
fashion as influencers, to increase awareness of its enforcement
activities and regulatory guidance.183 Its social media presence en-
ables the FTC “to answer questions and solicit input from the public
on various consumer protection subjects.”184 For instance, the FTC
has used Twitter to host conversations with consumers on issues
involving online security and identity theft.185 In September 2017,
the FTC held a Twitter chat that “address[ed] a range of issues”
regarding endorsement disclosures.186
All of these mechanisms align with the FTC’s mission of prevent-
ing the use of unfair or deceptive practices in commerce.187 Because
179. 1 ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, CONSUMER PROTECTION LAW DEVELOPMENTS
(SECOND) 523 (2016).
180. See id. at 153, 525; see, e.g., Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC to Host Spring
Seminars on Emerging Consumer Privacy Issues (Dec. 2, 2013), https://www.ftc.gov/news-
events/press-releases/2013/12/ftc-host-spring-seminars-emerging-consumer-privacy-issues
[https://perma.cc/PBT9-EB3K].
181. ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 179, at 525.
182. See, e.g., id. at 153; FED. TRADE COMM’N, FTC STAFF REPORT: SELF-REGULATORY
PRINCIPLES FOR ONLINE BEHAVIORAL ADVERTISING 1-2 (2009), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/
default/files/documents/reports/federal-trade-commission-staff-report-self-regulatory-
principles-online-behavioral-advertising/p085400behavadreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/UF49-
L3NA].
183. ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 179, at 525-26.
184. Id.
185. See, e.g., Tax Identity Theft Awareness Twitter Chat (Jan. 31, 2017, 3:00 PM), FED.
TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/events-calendar/2017/01/tax-identity-theft-
awareness-twitter-chat [https://perma.cc/47KR-AVRF]; Twitter Chat: Talking to Kids About
Online Safety, Security, and Privacy, FED. TRADE COMM’N (Feb. 14, 2017, 2:00 PM), https://
www.ftc.gov/news-events/events-calendar/2017/02/twitter-chat-talking-kids-about-online-
safety-security-privacy [https://perma.cc/W9RF-C6T8].
186. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC to Hold Twitter Chat on Social Media
Influencer Disclosures (Sept. 18, 2017), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2017/
09/ftc-hold-twitter-chat-social-media-influencer-disclosures [https://perma.cc/2V72-RMWE].
187. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (2012).
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the launch of an investigation does not guarantee that the FTC will
pursue an enforcement action, the FTC can leverage its investiga-
tive authority and prosecutorial discretion to motivate advertisers
to take immediate corrective action and update internal policies.188
Moreover, the risk or actual issuance of an administrative complaint
can incentivize an advertiser to enter a consent order consisting of
a voluntary agreement to discontinue the alleged deceptive prac-
tices and take steps to prevent future violations.189 Additionally, the
civil penalties facing advertisers who violate an order are more pre-
ventative than punitive because they discourage advertisers from
engaging in particular deceptive practices.190 The FTC has a variety
of enforcement mechanisms to choose from when evaluating how
best to prevent a particular deceptive advertising practice.
B. Insights from the FTC’s Exercise of Its Enforcement Discretion
Because the FTC addresses enforcement on a case-by-case basis,
the FTC’s influencer endorsement enforcement actions to date pro-
vide insight that is critical to understanding who will be subject to
an FTC endorsement enforcement investigation or action, when the
FTC will pursue consent orders, and on what terms the FTC will
settle an action.
1. Parties Subject to Endorsement Enforcement
Under the Guides, brands share responsibility for adequate en-
dorsement disclosures with influencers.191 Although the FTC has
not ruled out bringing enforcement actions against individual influ-
encers, the FTC primarily focuses its enforcement efforts on brands
and their advertising firms.192 To date, the FTC has enforced en-
dorsement disclosure requirements not only against brands, but also
188. See infra Part III.B.
189. See infra Part III.B.
190. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 148.
191. See supra notes 117-22 and accompanying text.
192. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 14; supra notes 135-39 and accompanying text.
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against an entertainment marketing network,193 several public
relations firms,194 and three individual influencers.195
In 2011, the FTC pursued an endorsement enforcement action
against the brand Legacy Learning Systems, Inc. (Legacy).196 The
FTC alleged that through Legacy’s online affiliate marketing
program, individuals “falsely posed as ordinary consumers or in-
dependent reviewers without clearly disclosing they were paid sub-
stantial commissions for every sale they generated.”197 Influencers
who shared Legacy’s affiliate links earned commissions “ranging
from 20% to 45% of the cost of each instructional course sold.”198
Influencers endorsed Legacy’s products on their personal websites,
and elsewhere on the Internet, without disclosing their material
connection to Legacy.199 The FTC found that twenty-five of these
affiliates generated “at least $5 million in sales.”200 The FTC pur-
sued enforcement against Legacy for the “fail[ure] to disclose, or dis-
close adequately, that the endorser receives financial compensation
from the sale of Legacy’s products” because “[t]his fact would be
193. See Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Xbox One Promoter Settles FTC Charges That
It Deceived Consumers with Endorsement Videos Posted by Paid ‘Influencers’ (Sept. 2, 2015),
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2015/09/xbox-one-promoter-settles-ftc-charges-
it-deceived-consumers [https://perma.cc/QQ2J-RS2S].
194. See, e.g., Letter from Mary K. Engle, Assoc. Dir., Div. of Advert. Practices, Fed. Trade
Comm’n, to Christopher Smith, Counsel, Hyundai Motor Am. (Nov. 16, 2011) [hereinafter
Hyundai Closing Letter], https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/closing_letters/
hyundai-motor-america/111116hyundaimotorletter.pdf [https://perma.cc/BE2A-BAJ8].
195. See Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, supra note 24; Letter from Mary K. Engle,
Assoc. Dir., Div. of Advert. Practices, Fed. Trade Comm’n, to George L. Paul, Counsel, Alison
Rhodes-Jacobson 1 (Mar. 10, 2014) [hereinafter Rhodes-Jacobson Letter], https://www.ftc.gov/
enforcement/cases-proceedings/closing-letters/alison-rhodes-jacobson [https://perma.cc/QC5E-
NSUX]. Although the FTC sent warning letters to individual influencers in April 2017, those
letters did not initiate any formal investigation or other enforcement action against individual
influencers. See Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Staff Reminds Influencers and
Brands to Clearly Disclose Relationship (Apr. 19, 2017), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/
press-releases/2017/04/ftc-staff-reminds-influencers-brands-clearly-disclose [https://perma.cc/
GAS7-Q2GP].
196. See Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Approves Final Order Settling Charges
That Firm Used Misleading Online Reviews (June 10, 2011), https://www.ftc.gov/news-
events/press-releases/2011/06/ftc-approves-final-order-settling-charges-firm-used-misleading
[https://perma.cc/5ARA-VAZW].
197. Id.
198. Legacy Learning Sys., Inc., 151 F.T.C. 383, 384 (2011) (No. C-4323) (Complaint).
199. See id. at 384-85.
200. Id. at 386.
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material to consumers in their purchasing decision.”201 In June
2011, the FTC finalized the order settling charges of deceptive
advertising against Legacy.202
In some cases, the FTC has not pursued enforcement against the
brand, and it has proceeded instead with enforcement only against
the party that is responsible for directing and compensating the
influencers.203 As a result of inadequate endorsement disclosures in
a YouTube influencer campaign promoting Microsoft’s Xbox One
system, the FTC initiated an investigation into the actions of Micro-
soft Corporation (Microsoft); Microsoft’s advertising agency, Starcom
Media Vest Group (Starcom); and Machinima, Inc. (Machinima), an
entertainment network that contracted with Starcom to run the
YouTube influencer campaign.204 Ultimately, the FTC closed its
investigation into Microsoft and Starcom and issued a complaint
against Machinima.205 In its closing letter, the FTC acknowledged
that Microsoft and Starcom were responsible for the influencers’
failures to disclose.206 Nevertheless, the FTC found that “[t]he fail-
ures to disclose here appear to be isolated incidents that occurred in
spite of, and not in the absence of, policies and procedures designed
to prevent such lapses.”207 The FTC considered that “Microsoft and
Starcom took swift action to require that Machinima insert dis-
closures into the campaign videos once they learned that Machinima
had paid the influencers and that no disclosures had been made.”208
Thus, the FTC also pursued enforcement action only against
201. Id. at 387.
202. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, supra note 196.
203. Compare Complaint, Machinima, Inc., F.T.C. Docket No. C-4569 at paras. 3, 5, 8, 25
(Mar. 16, 2016) [hereinafter Machinima Complaint], https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/
documents/ cases/160317machinimacmpt.pdf [https://perma.cc/QZL6-8NUQ], with Complaint,
Warner Bros. Home Entm’t Inc., F.T.C. Docket No. C-4595, at paras. 4, 7-10, 16 (Nov. 17,
2016) [hereinafter Warner Bros. Complaint], https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/
cases/161811warner_bros_complaint.pdf [https://perma.cc/3RB9-N8VN] (asserting that al-
though Warner Bros. hired an advertising agency to run a YouTube influencer campaign,
Warner Bros. set the minimum requirements for each influencer’s video and the videos were
subject to pre-approval by Warner Bros.; thus, Warner Bros. was responsible for ensuring that
the influencers adequately disclosed their material relationship).
204. See Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, supra note 193.
205. See id.
206. Microsoft and Starcom Letter, supra note 156, at 2.
207. Id.
208. Id. (emphasis added).
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Machinima, the party responsible for recruiting, contracting with,
directing, and compensating the influencers.209
On September 7, 2017, the FTC announced its first complaint
against individual influencers.210 Trevor “TmarTn” Martin and
Thomas “Syndicate” Cassell both posted on YouTube and Twitter
promoting their company, CSGO Lotto, Inc. without “disclos[ing]
they jointly owned the company.”211 Although this action targeted
two individual influencers in their individual capacities, the action
also targeted their company, CSGO Lotto, Inc.212 CSGO Lotto, Inc.
“allegedly paid other well-known influencers thousands of dollars to
promote the site on YouTube, Twitch, Twitter, and Facebook,
without requiring them to disclose the payments in their social
media posts.”213
Naming Martin and Cassell as individuals in this action may
signal that the FTC is serious about enforcing endorsement dis-
closures against individual influencers. However, Martin and
Cassell were not targeted solely because they promoted CGSO Lotto
without making proper endorsement disclosures.214 Martin is the
President and Cassell is the Vice President of CGSO Lotto, Inc.215
Notably, the FTC did not target any other influencers who were
identified in the complaint as failing to make proper endorsement
disclosures.216
There is at least one other instance in which the FTC initiated an
investigation into an individual influencer for failing to disclose her
material relationship with a brand.217 The influencer had made nu-
merous paid media appearances endorsing a home security sys-
tem.218 The FTC’s investigation reviewed the influencer’s media
appearances, website, and blog posts to determine whether she had
209. See Machinima Complaint, supra note 203, paras. 9-22.
210. See Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, supra note 24.
211. See id.
212. See Complaint, CSGO Lotto, Inc., F.T.C. File No. C-4632 (Nov. 28, 2017) [hereinafter
CSGO Lotto Complaint], https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/1623184_csgo
lotto_complaint.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y72M-YAPB].
213. See Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, supra note 24.
214. See CGSO Lotto Complaint, supra note 212, paras. 2-3.
215. Id.
216. See generally id.
217. See Rhodes-Jacobson Letter, supra note 195, at 1.
218. See id.
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adequately disclosed her relationship with the brand.219 Ultimately,
the FTC issued a closing letter to the influencer and pursued an
enforcement action against the brand.220 In deciding to close their
investigation, the FTC considered that the influencer immediately
took steps to “revise her website and other online materials within
her control to include appropriate disclosures.”221
Even though the FTC is not actively monitoring the behavior of
individual influencers, the FTC is willing to take at least the first
step toward an enforcement action against an individual influencer
by initiating an investigation into that individual influencer’s
endorsement disclosure practices. And, depending on the circum-
stances, the FTC is also willing to issue a complaint against indi-
vidual influencers and their company. 
2. Closing Letter Commonalities and the Pursuit of Consent
Orders
The FTC has issued closing letters in investigations involving the
enforcement of endorsement disclosure requirements when the FTC
determines that the brand’s or advertising agency’s failure to re-
quire an influencer to disclose their material relationship with the
brand is an isolated incident with a limited reach.222 In most of these
219. See id.
220. See id.; Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Home Security Company ADT Settles FTC
Charges that Endorsements Deceived Consumers (Mar. 6, 2014), https://www.ftc.gov/news-
events/press-releases/2014/03/home-security-company-adt-settles-ftc-charges-endorsements
[https://perma.cc/7PKZ-5V8L].
221. Rhodes-Jacobson Letter, supra note 195, at 1-2. 
222. See, e.g., Letter from Mary K. Engle, Assoc. Dir., Div. of Advert. Practices, Fed. Trade
Comm’n, to Christie Grymes Thompson, Counsel, Cole Haan 1-2 (Mar. 20, 2014) [hereinafter
Cole Haan Closing Letter], https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/closing_letters/cole-
haan-inc./140320colehaanclosingletter.pdf [https://perma.cc/ER8W-9H3F] (noting that the
FTC did not pursue enforcement because “the contest ran for a limited time and drew a
relatively small number of contestants”); Letter from Mary K. Engle, Assoc. Dir., Div. of
Advert. Practices, Fed. Trade Comm’n, to Aaron Hendelman & Lydia Parnes, Counsel,
Nordstrom Rack (Feb. 22, 2013) [hereinafter Nordstrom Rack Closing Letter], https://www.ftc.
gov/sites/default/files/documents/closing_letters/nordstrom-rack/130222nordstrom
rackletter.pdf [https://perma.cc/NF7V-WW2B] (noting that the FTC did not pursue
enforcement because of “the limited nature of the event at issue”); Letter from Mary K. Engle,
Assoc. Dir., Div. of Advert. Practices, Fed. Trade Comm’n, to Kenneth A. Plevan, Counsel,
AnnTaylor Stores Corp. (Apr. 20, 2010) [hereinafter AnnTaylor Closing Letter], https://www.
ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/closing_letters/anntaylor-stores-corporation/
100420anntaylorclosingletter.pdf [https://perma.cc/2CHJ-39C2] (noting that the FTC did not
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instances, the endorsements had a limited reach due to the small
number of influencers who posted, and some of those influencers
did include a disclosure in their posts.223 The FTC also considered
whether the brand and advertising agency took corrective action as
soon as they were aware of the disclosure issue,224 and whether the
brand and advertising agency had implemented a new influencer
endorsement disclosure policy that complied with FTC guidance or
updated an existing policy to ensure adequate disclosures in the
future.225 Finally, the FTC did not pursue further enforcement ac-
tion when it had not previously publicly addressed an issue, such as
whether a contest entry constituted a material connection and
whether a pin on Pinterest constituted an endorsement.226
In contrast, the FTC has pursued further enforcement action
when the influencer campaigns have resulted in significant
pursue enforcement because the event at issue was the first and only such event).
223. See, e.g., Nordstrom Rack Closing Letter, supra note 222, at 1 (noting that the FTC
did not pursue enforcement because of “the fact that several social media influencers who
posted content about the preview did disclose”); Letter from Mary K. Engle, Assoc. Dir., Div.
of Advert. Practices, Fed. Trade Comm’n, to John D. Graubert, Counsel, Hewlett-Packard Co.,
& Amanda P. Reeves, Counsel, Porter Novelli, Inc. 2 (Sept. 27, 2012) [hereinafter HP Inkology
Closing Letter], https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/closing_letters/hp-inkology/
120927hpinkologycltr.pdf [https://perma.cc/7F5N-X9KJ] (noting that the FTC did not pursue
enforcement because “a relatively small number of bloggers posted content ... and a few of
those bloggers did adequately disclose their material connections”); Hyundai Closing Letter,
supra note 194, at 1 (noting that the FTC did not pursue enforcement because “a relatively
small number of bloggers received the gift certificates, and ... some of them did, in fact,
disclose this information”); AnnTaylor Closing Letter, supra note 222, at 1 (noting that the
FTC did not pursue enforcement because “only a very small number of bloggers posted content
about the preview, and several of those bloggers disclosed”).
224. See, e.g., Hyundai Closing Letter, supra note 194, at 1 (noting that the FTC decided
not to pursue enforcement because “upon learning of the misconduct, the media firm promptly
took action to address it”); supra note 208 and accompanying text.
225. See, e.g., Nordstrom Rack Closing Letter, supra note 222, at 1 (noting that the FTC
did not pursue enforcement because of “Nordstrom’s having revised its written social media
policies to adequately address [the FTC’s] concerns”); HP Inkology Closing Letter, supra note
223, at 2 (noting that the FTC did not pursue enforcement because “both companies have
revised their written social media policies to adequately address [the FTC’s] concerns”);
Hyundai Closing Letter, supra note 194, at 1 (noting that the FTC did not pursue enforcement
because “the actions at issue here were contrary both to Hyundai’s established social media
policy, which calls for bloggers to disclose their receipt of compensation, and to the policies of
the media firm in question”); AnnTaylor Closing Letter, supra note 222, at 1 (noting that the
FTC did not pursue enforcement because LOFT adopted a written policy following the
incident “stating that LOFT will not issue any gift to any blogger without first telling the
blogger that the blogger must disclose the gift in his or her blog”).
226. Cole Haan Closing Letter, supra note 222.
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monetary returns to the brand227 and when the influencer cam-
paigns have reached several million consumers.228 The FTC has also
pursued enforcement when the contracts with influencers subjected
the influencers’ posts to pre-approval229 and when the contracts with
influencers did not require disclosures230 or adequate disclosures.231
The FTC has also pursued further enforcement for “fail[ing] to im-
plement a reasonable monitoring program to ensure that ...
affiliates clearly and prominently disclose their relationship [with
227. See, e.g., Legacy Learning Sys., Inc., 151 F.T.C. 383, 386 (2011) (Complaint) (alleging
that twenty-five of Legacy’s affiliates “are responsible for at least $5 million in sales”).
228. See CGSO Lotto Complaint, supra note 212, para. 14 (alleging that “Cassell’s videos
promoting CGSO Lotto garnered more than 5.7 million views”); Machinima Complaint, supra
note 203, para. 21 (alleging that Machinima’s influencers’ videos “generated more than 30
million views”); Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Warner Bros. Settles FTC Charges It
Failed to Adequately Disclose It Paid Online Influencers to Post Gameplay Videos (July 11,
2016), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2016/07/warner-bros-settles-ftc-charges-
it-failed-adequately-disclose-it [https://perma.cc/8C5M-UPF4] (“Over the course of the
campaign, the sponsored videos were viewed more than 5.5 million times.”); Press Release,
Fed. Trade Comm’n, Lord & Taylor Settles FTC Charges It Deceived Consumers Through
Paid Article in an Online Fashion Magazine and Paid Instagram Posts by 50 “Fashion
Influencers” (Mar. 15, 2016), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2016/03/lord-
taylor-settles-ftc-charges-it-deceived-consumers-through [https://perma.cc/8HVL-4J8D] (“In
total, the influencers’ posts reached 11.4 million individual Instagram users over just two
days, led to 328,000 brand engagements with Lord & Taylor’s own Instagram handle, and the
dress quickly sold out.”). 
229. See, e.g., Warner Bros. Complaint, supra note 203, para. 12 (“By contract, influencers’
videos were subject to pre-approval ... to ensure that they conformed with respondent’s re-
quirements. On at least one occasion, respondent reviewed and approved an influencer video
with an inadequate sponsorship disclosure before it was made public.”); Complaint, Lord &
Taylor, LLC, F.T.C. Docket No. C-4576, para. 7 (May 20, 2016) [hereinafter Lord & Taylor
Complaint], https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/160523lordtaylorcmpt.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3GXW-86ZV] (alleging that Lord & Taylor subjected influencer’s posts to pre-
approval, edited some of the influencers’ proposed posts, and did not edit any of the fifty
Instagram posts to add a disclosure). 
230. See, e.g., Lord & Taylor Complaint, supra note 229, para. 6 (“Although Lord & Taylor’s
Design Lab influencer contracts detailed the manner in which Respondent was to be
mentioned in each Instagram posting, the contracts did not require the influencers to disclose
in their postings that Respondent had compensated them, nor did Respondent otherwise
obligate the influencers to disclose that they had been compensated.”); Machinima Complaint,
supra note 203, paras. 14, 20 (“Respondent did not otherwise oblige the influencers to disclose
in their videos that they had been compensated.”).
231. See, e.g., Warner Bros. Complaint, supra note 203, para. 9 (“Respondent did not
require that the YouTube influencers be instructed to place a sponsorship disclosure clearly
and conspicuously in the video itself. Nor did respondent require that the YouTube influencers
be instructed to place the sponsorship disclosure ‘above the fold’ in the description box, or
visible without consumers having to scroll down or click on a link.”).
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the brand].”232 With these enforcement actions, the FTC has sig-
naled its willingness to pursue enforcement for failures to disclose,
inadequate disclosures, and failures to monitor influencers when the
deceptive advertising practice has a large impact on consumers.
These enforcement actions are typically resolved with consent
orders.
3. Consent Order Terms
Consent orders are reflective of the FTC’s prophylactic mission
and aim to prevent future violations by the same party.233 Part I
of an order addressing endorsement disclosures typically states,
“[R]espondents ... shall not misrepresent, in any manner, expressly
or by implication, ... that the ... endorser is an independent user or
ordinary consumer of the product or service.”234 Part II of an order
usually states, “[R]espondent ... shall clearly and conspicuously, and
in close proximity to the representation, disclose a material con-
nection, if one exists, between such endorser and Respondent.”235 To
accomplish these goals, orders require respondents to educate
influencers about disclosures through the signing of a disclosure
agreement,236 make compensation to influencers contingent on
232. See, e.g., Legacy Learning Sys., Inc., 151 F.T.C. at 386 (Complaint) (noting that even
though a contract clause required affiliates to “comply with the FTC guidelines on disclosures”
it was ineffective without a monitoring program).
233. See 15 U.S.C. § 45(m) (2012) (providing for judicial enforcement of order against the
party the order was issued against).
234. Legacy Learning Sys., Inc., 151 F.T.C. at 391 (Decision & Order); see also Decision &
Order at 3, Warner Bros. Home Entm’t Inc., F.T.C. Docket No. C-4595 (Nov. 17, 2016)
[hereinafter Warner Bros. Order], https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/161811_c-
4595_warner_bros_do.pdf [https://perma.cc/7MU9-5ZQJ]; Decision and Order at 2, Lord &
Taylor, LLC, F.T.C. Docket No. C-4576 (May 20, 2016) [hereinafter Lord & Taylor Order],
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/160523lordtaylordo.pdf [https://perma.cc/
CXX5-DT3Y]; Decision and Order at 3, Machinima, Inc., F.T.C. Docket No. C-4569 (Mar. 16,
2016) [hereinafter Machinima Order], https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/
160317machinimado.pdf [https://perma.cc/R4Y3-6C9N].
235. Lord & Taylor Order, supra note 234, at 4; see also Warner Bros. Order, supra note
234, at 3; Machinima Order, supra note 234, at 3; Legacy Learning Sys., Inc., 151 F.T.C. at
391-92 (Decision & Order).
236. See, e.g., Lord & Taylor Order, supra note 234, at 4; see also Warner Bros. Order,
supra note 234, at 4; Machinima Order, supra note 234, at 4; Legacy Learning Sys., Inc., 151
F.T.C. at 394 (Decision & Order).
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adequate disclosure,237 and disqualify any noncompliant influencer
from an affiliate program or future influencer campaign.238 Orders
also outline monitoring programs tailored to the party’s business
practices.239 For example, Legacy’s order required Legacy to
monitor, on a monthly basis, its “top fifty (50) revenue-generating
[a]ffiliates” and “a random sample of fifty [additional affiliates]” to
ensure disclosures are clearly and conspicuously made.240 An order
may also include a nonpunitive monetary payment to provide
redress.241 These terms provide a formula for future consent orders
as part of a multipronged enforcement approach.
IV. PROPOSAL: A MULTIPRONGED ENFORCEMENT APPROACH
In accordance with the FTC’s preventative mission, the FTC
should pursue endorsement disclosure enforcement actions against
top influencers and large affiliate networks that result in consent
orders.242 The FTC should protect its enforcement legitimacy in this
area by avoiding enforcement mechanisms that would result in
strict liability for a failure to disclose an endorsement.243 The FTC
should also increase its outreach to individual influencers to prevent
endorsement disclosure problems with up-and-coming influencers.244
This multipronged enforcement approach maximizes the FTC’s
limited resources and minimizes harm to consumers by targeting
individuals and companies who possess the potential to cause great
economic harm by generating purchases through deceptive prac-
tices.245 Increased enforcement efforts in this area are critical;
237. See, e.g., Machinima Order, supra note 234, at 4; Legacy Learning Sys., Inc., 151
F.T.C. at 394 (Decision & Order).
238. See, e.g., Warner Bros. Order, supra note 234, at 4-5; Lord & Taylor Order, supra note
234, at 4-5; Machinima Order, supra note 234, at 5; Legacy Learning Sys., Inc., 151 F.T.C. at
393 (Decision & Order).
239. Compare Legacy Learning Sys., Inc., 151 F.T.C. at 392-93 (Decision & Order), with
Warner Bros. Order, supra note 234, at 4-5 (establishing a program requiring Warner Bros.
to monitor and review all of their influencers’ postings that are part of any future influencer
campaign).
240. Legacy Learning Sys., Inc., 151 F.T.C. at 392-93 (Decision & Order).
241. See, e.g., id. at 394-95 (requiring a $250,000 payment for redress).
242. See supra Part III.A.
243. See infra Part IV.D.
244. See infra Part IV.E.
245. See RICHARDS, supra note 143, at 17-19.
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although consumers can easily evaluate the products for them-
selves, this is an area that is not experiencing market correction
because there is a considerable incentive to misrepresent and not
disclose material relationships.246
A. Targeting Top Influencers
The FTC should pursue endorsement disclosure enforcement
actions against top influencers. The FTC typically pursues enforce-
ment actions against the least cost avoider: the party that is best
situated to avoid similar deceptive acts in the future.247 With regard
to proper disclosure of affiliate links, the individual influencer who
is sharing the link is the party best situated to ensure adequate
disclosures are made on each advertising platform that influencer
uses. Further, the FTC has not ruled out enforcement against an
individual influencer. It has previously initiated at least one inves-
tigation into the endorsement disclosures of an individual influencer
and pursued enforcement action against two others.248 
April 2017 “marked the first time the [FTC] directly contacted
influencers to provide guidance on proper disclosure.”249 Following
calls for FTC enforcement action against members of the notorious
Kardashian family and other celebrities who have failed to make
adequate endorsement disclosures on their Instagram accounts,250
the FTC issued over ninety warning letters to brands and in-
fluencers.251 These warning letters flagged Instagram posts that
246. See FTC POLICY STATEMENT ON DECEPTION, supra note 85; see also supra Part I.C.
247. See supra Part III.B.1.
248. See supra Part III.B.1.
249. C. Ryan Barber, Who Got Those Social ‘Influencer’ Letters from the FTC? Read the Full
List., NAT’L L. J. (May 5, 2017), http://www.nationallawjournal.com/id=1202785302263/Who-
Got-Those-Social-Influencer-Letters-From-the-FTC-Read-the-Full-List [https://perma.cc/K9
S3-C87E].
250. Letter from Pub. Citizen to Jessica L. Rich, Dir., Bureau of Consumer Prot., Fed.
Trade Comm’n, & Mary K. Engle, Assoc. Dir., Div. of Advert. Practices, Fed. Trade Comm’n
(Sept. 7, 2016), https://www.citizen.org/sites/default/files/letter-to-ftc-instagram-endorsements
.pdf [https://perma.cc/49WL-SWD7]; Letter from Laura Smith, Legal Dir., Truth in Advertis-
ing, Inc., & Bonnie Patten, Exec. Dir., Truth in Advertising, Inc., to Jessica L. Rich, Dir., Bu-
reau of Consumer Prot., Fed. Trade Comm’n, & Mary K. Engle, Assoc. Dir., Div. of Advert.
Practices, Fed. Trade Comm’n (Aug. 25, 2016), https://www.truthinadvertising.org/wp-content/
uploads/2016/08/8_25_16-ltr-from-TINA-to-FTC-re-Kardashian-Jenner-Instagram-posts.pdf
[https://perma.cc/K8RX-22VQ].
251. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, supra note 195; see also Barber, supra note 249.
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appeared to endorse a product or service without a proper disclo-
sure.252 In the letters, the FTC reminded influencers and brands
that they are subject to the Guides and any material connection
must be disclosed clearly and conspicuously.253 Notably, these letters
addressed only endorsement disclosures on Instagram and did not
address disclosures on any other media platforms or in connection
with affiliate links.254 Nor did these letters indicate that the FTC
would take any further enforcement action against the influencers
or brands.255
The FTC learned that some of the flagged posts were not paid
endorsements but were products the influencer independently
decided to promote.256 This further highlights the importance of
clear and conspicuous endorsement disclosures.257 These disclosures
enable consumers to know that when there is no disclosure there is
no material relationship between the influencer and the brand she
is promoting.258 Consumers can then make fully informed decisions
about how much weight to give to any given endorsement.259
For the brands and influencers who did fail to disclose paid en-
dorsements, the warning letters had a limited impact. At least two
brands responded by reviewing their endorsement disclosure pol-
icies and implementing the FTC’s recommendations for clear and
conspicuous disclosures.260 However, a Freedom of Information Act
request from The National Law Journal “turned up no records of
correspondence from any celebrit[y] [influencers] or their repre-
sentatives [to the FTC].”261 From May 1 to June 12, 2017, Public
252. Sample Letter from Fed. Trade Comm’n to Influencer, https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/
attachments/press-releases/ftc-staff-reminds-influencers-brands-clearly-disclose-relationship/
influencer_template.pdf [https://perma.cc/7KFK-RDL2].
253. Id.
254. See id.; see also Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, supra note 195.
255. See Sample Letter from Fed. Trade Comm’n to Influencer, supra note 252.
256. C. Ryan Barber, How In-House Lawyers Responded to the FTC’s ‘Influencer’ Letters,
NAT’L L.J. (May 26, 2017), http://www.nationallawjournal.com/id=1202787613698/How-In
House-Lawyers-Responded-to-the-FTCs-Influencer-Letters [https://perma.cc/L922-SEYJ].
257. See supra Part I.C.
258. See supra Part I.C.
259. See supra Part I.C.
260. Barber, supra note 256 (detailing Hormel Foods and FabFitFun’s responses to the
warning letters).
261. Id.
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Citizen monitored the Instagram accounts of forty-six influencers
who received a warning letter from the FTC.262 Public Citizen found,
Of the influencers who posted sponsored content, only one fully
and consistently complied with FTC policy. While some users
posted advertisements using a disclosure, the same influencers
continued to post undisclosed content. In total, 327 (79 percent)
of the 412 advertisements posted by the 46 influencers did not
comply with FTC standards.263
In September 2017, the FTC sent follow-up letters to twenty-one
influencers who received warning letters.264 Unlike the initial let-
ters, these follow-up letters requested a response from the influ-
encers. The FTC asked influencers to “advis[e] the FTC staff of
whether [the influencer] ha[s] a material connection with each of
the brands or businesses ... endorsed in the[ ] posts.”265 If the influ-
encer has a material connection with the brand, the FTC asked the
influencer to “describe what actions [the influencer is] or will be
taking to ensure that” future endorsements are clearly and conspic-
uously disclosed.266 Although these follow-up letters indicate greater
FTC scrutiny of individual influencers’ endorsement disclosures,
that scrutiny appears be limited to a small group of influencers and
their posts on Instagram. This scrutiny does not address disclosures
in connection with affiliate links.
Although the FTC can, and has, taken limited action against in-
dividual influencers, these actions have clearly been insufficient. As
one commentator noted, “[The FTC’s] enforcement thus far has
proven inconsistent and arguably ineffective, leaving consumers vul-
nerable to confusion when viewing brands’, celebs’, and influencers’
262. Press Release, Pub. Citizen, Investigation Shows that FTC’s Reminder Letters Are
Ineffective at Disclosing Paid Posts on Instagram (June 26, 2017), https://www.citizen.org/
media/press-releases/investigation-shows-ftc%E2%80%99s-reminder-letters-are-ineffective-
disclosing-paid-0 [https://perma.cc/TZ6E-8KPV].
263. Id.
264. See Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, supra note 24.
265. Sample Letter from Mary K. Engel, Assoc. Dir., Div. of Advert. Practices, Fed. Trade
Comm’n, to Influencer (Sept. 6, 2017), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/attachments/press-
releases/los-propietarios-de-csgo-lotto-resuelven-la-primera-demanda-jamas-entablada-contra-
influyentes-de/instagram_influencer_warning_letter_template_9-6-17.pdf [https://perma.cc/
NFX2-K3N6].
266. Id.
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posts.”267 It is essential that the FTC pursue further enforcement
action, starting with formal investigations into the endorsement
disclosure practice of individual influencers who fail to adequately
disclose affiliate links.
To maximize the FTC’s limited enforcement resources, the FTC
should pursue enforcement action against only professional influ-
encers who generate a significant amount of revenue from affiliate
links and have millions of followers. Government action against
these individuals is necessary because for many of these individuals,
being an influencer is their full-time job.268 They have a responsibil-
ity to know and follow the laws that govern and regulate their
industry—which includes adequately disclosing material relation-
ships.
Pursuing selected professional influencers will not only encourage
adequate endorsement disclosures among other professional influ-
encers, but will also demonstrate to up-and-coming influencers that
making adequate endorsement disclosures is a nonnegotiable ele-
ment of true success as a professional influencer.
B. Targeting Affiliate Networks
The FTC should also pursue endorsement disclosure enforcement
actions against affiliate networks. The FTC has previously pursued
enforcement against a brand’s in-house affiliate marketing program
whose affiliates failed to disclose or adequately disclose their
material relationship with the brand.269 However, both brands and
intermediaries are responsible for implementing programs to
monitor their influencers’ disclosures and ensure all disclosures are
clear and conspicuous.270 Moreover, the FTC typically pursues
enforcement actions against the party that is responsible for
directing and compensating the influencers because that party is
best situated ensure compliance with endorsement disclosure
267. In Light of Continued Violations, How Effective Were the FTC’s Letters Really?,
FASHION L. (June 7, 2017), http://www.thefashionlaw.com/home/in-light-of-continued-
violations-how-effective-were-the-ftcs-letters-really?rq=How%20Effective%20were%
20the%20FTC%27s%20letters%20really%3F [https://perma.cc/W8PS-2UTD].
268. See Strugatz, supra note 10.
269. See supra notes 196-202 and accompanying text.
270. See supra note 232 and accompanying text.
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requirements.271 Thus, affiliate networks—which are responsible for
recruiting, directing, and compensating influencers—are best
situated to monitor influencers for adequate endorsement disclo-
sures.272 Therefore, the FTC should pursue enforcement action
against affiliate networks whose influencers fail to disclose or fail
to adequately disclose their material relationships.
With complete control of its recruitment of influencers, an af-
filiate network can make admission to its program contingent on
completing an endorsement disclosure training course or signing an
endorsement disclosure agreement.273 As the party that tracks
influencer performance and advises influencers on how to maximize
profit, the network is best positioned to implement an endorsement
disclosure monitoring program and advise influencers on the
adequacy of their disclosures.274 The network can incentivize influ-
encer compliance by making compensation contingent on adequate
disclosures and expelling noncompliant influencers from the pro-
gram.275 Additionally, the affiliate network can also add disclosures
to embeddable widgets and promotional emails that contain affiliate
links.276
C. Pursuing Consent Orders
The FTC has an effective tool for enforcement against influencers
and affiliate networks: the consent order. A consent order allows the
advertiser to settle deception allegations by entering into a volun-
tary agreement to discontinue the alleged deceptive practices and
take steps to prevent potential future violations.277 Closing investi-
gations into individual influencers and affiliate networks with con-
sent orders is consistent with the FTC’s other enforcement actions
involving influencers who failed to disclose or adequately disclose
271. See supra Part III.B.1.
272. See supra Part III.B.1.
273. See supra Part III.B.3.
274. See supra Part I.B. But cf. Mari, supra note 57 (noting that rewardStyle provides
influencers with “link[s] out to the most updated rules and laws” and places the burden on the
influencer to comply with the law).
275. See supra Part III.B.3.
276. See supra Part I.B.
277. See supra Parts III.A, III.B.3.
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material relationships.278 Further, consent orders are warranted
when the deceptive practice has impacted several million people or
generated millions in revenue.279
It is essential for the FTC to pursue consent orders in these cases
and demonstrate that adequate endorsement disclosures with
affiliate links are nonnegotiable in influencer marketing. This will
serve the FTC’s prophylactic mission by encouraging other in-
fluencers to make adequate endorsement disclosures and other
affiliate networks to take steps to ensure their influencers make
adequate endorsement disclosures.280 Thus, the FTC can leverage
the terms of the consent orders to establish effective endorsement
disclosure monitoring systems that set an industry standard, en-
suring compliance with FTC endorsement disclosure require-
ments.281
Ending these investigations with closing letters would be
inappropriate because these failures to disclose or adequately dis-
close are not isolated incidents.282 Rather, these professional
influencers and affiliate marketing companies reach millions of
consumers on a daily basis across multiple advertising platforms,
generating millions in revenue.283 Moreover, this is not a novel
issue.284 The FTC has publicly and clearly stated that an affiliate
link is an endorsement that requires an adequate disclosure of the
material relationship between the blogger and the brand.285
D. Avoiding a Strict Liability Approach
The FTC could pursue a strict liability approach through admin-
istrative adjudication or administrative rulemaking.286 However, it
would be incredibly challenging for the FTC to prosecute every
instance in which an influencer fails to disclose or inadequately
278. See supra notes 229-32 and accompanying text.
279. See supra notes 227-28 and accompanying text.
280. See supra Part III.B.3.
281. See supra Part III.B.3.
282. See supra Part III.B.2.
283. See supra Part I.
284. See supra Part III.B.2.
285. See supra notes 128-31 and accompanying text.
286. See supra notes 168-73 and accompanying text.
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discloses a material relationship with an affiliate link.287 A mecha-
nism that cannot be effectively enforced lacks a deterrent effect. If
the FTC fails to monitor and subsequently prosecute each and every
breach, prosecution of only some breaches becomes more punitive
than preventative.288 Accordingly, a strict liability approach to en-
forcement with respect to influencer endorsement disclosures would
jeopardize the legitimacy of the FTC’s enforcement power and yield
more punitive than preventative results.
E. Increasing FTC Engagement with Individual Influencers
Outreach and engagement with stakeholders are the FTC’s most
important prophylactic enforcement mechanisms.289 As an initial
step, the FTC should raise the profile of the two guidance docu-
ments290 it has created to help businesses and individuals apply the
Guides to influencer marketing.291 The FTC’s distribution of these
documents should be targeted to top influencers and affiliate net-
works because they are the least cost avoiders. The FTC should also
encourage affiliate networks to disseminate these documents to
their influencers.
In its capacity as a convenor, the FTC should hold a public
workshop or seminar to bring together influencers and advertisers
who can speak to influencer marketing across multiple social media
platforms and industries.292 Through these dialogues, the FTC can
actively engage with influencers and advertisers to identify areas
of confusion with the Guides and opportunities to educate influ-
encers on how to make adequate endorsement disclosures.293
287. See, e.g., supra note 43 and accompanying text. 
288. See supra notes 83, 143-44 and accompanying text.
289. See Annual Highlights 2015: Education, FED. TRADE COMM’N (2015), https://www.ftc.
gov/reports/annual-highlights-2015/education [https://perma.cc/4Q32-NKPF]. For a discussion
of how the FTC has effectively used similar outreach measures in the privacy context, see
generally Steven Hetcher, The FTC as Internet Privacy Norm Entrepreneur, 53 VAND. L. REV.
2041 (2000).
290. The two guidance documents are .com Disclosures: How to Make Effective Disclosures
in Digital Advertising, FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 104, and The FTC’s Endorsement
Guides: What People Are Asking, FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 14.
291. See supra note 179 and accompanying text.
292. See supra notes 179-82 and accompanying text.
293. See supra notes 181-82 and accompanying text.
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Through its social media presence, the FTC can directly engage
with influencers on their turf. The FTC should actively promote its
guidance documents to influencers on its social media channels.294
The FTC should also ensure that it disseminates information
through social media about its enforcement activities relating to
endorsement disclosures.295 Without effective communication to in-
fluencers about the FTC’s increased enforcement activities in this
area, those actions will have little deterrent effect.
In September 2017, the FTC leveraged its Twitter presence to
host a Twitter chat with influencers and informally field questions
from influencers about adequate endorsement disclosures.296 Of the
twenty-six questions that the FTC addressed, three touched on
disclosing affiliate links.297 During the Twitter chat, the FTC re-
affirmed that “[w]hen an individual is posting content as an
affiliate, he/she is usually an influencer.”298 The FTC also “advise[d]
disclosing affiliate relationships.”299 This Twitter chat appears to be
a step in the right direction. However, active engagement and
communication with influencers requires more than just a one-hour
Twitter chat. The FTC should continue to improve its engagement
with influencers by following through on its tweet noting that “a
part II [m]ay be needed.”300 The FTC can further improve its
engagement with influencers by making educational posts about
adequate influencer endorsement disclosures part of its regular
social media postings.
The FTC should also explore opportunities to engage with the
influencer community and encourage voluntary compliance through
partnerships with brands, affiliate networks, and professional in-
fluencers. A partnership could be as simple as including an FTC
presentation on endorsement disclosure requirements at a national
294. See supra note 183 and accompanying text.
295. See supra note 183 and accompanying text.
296. See Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, supra note 186.
297. The author reviewed the FTC’s tweets from September 20, 2017, that contained the
Twitter chat’s hashtag, “#Influencers101.” See FTC (@FTC), TWITTER, https://twitter.com/FTC
[https://perma.cc/NA7L-T3P6].
298. FTC (@FTC), Twitter (Sept. 20, 2017, 1:22 PM), https://twitter.com/FTC/status/910
600067312160773 [https://perma.cc/74XM-HU8N].
299. FTC (@FTC), Twitter (Sept. 20, 2017, 1:22 PM), https://twitter.com/FTC/status/910
600004020162561 [https://perma.cc/4YPW-L8UK].
300. FTC (@FTC), Twitter (Sept. 20, 2017, 1:51 PM) https://twitter.com/FTC/status/910
607437237014529 [https://perma.cc/R3KH-5QNS].
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influencer conference.301 A partnership could also take the form of
collaborating on a blog or social media post with a prominent
influencer like Bryan Boy, who strives to be transparent with his
followers about his endorsements.302 
Finally, the FTC should also take an assertive approach to
outreach by adding affiliate link marketing and influencers to the
list of targets during organized surfs.303 Following the surfs, the
FTC can issue warning letters to noncompliant influencers to
promote adequate endorsement disclosures.304 The FTC’s issuance
of warning letters in April 2017 demonstrates that this type of
outreach is feasible, yet not completely effective.305 Nevertheless,
preventing deceptive endorsements at their inception requires
educating professional and amateur influencers about how to
adequately disclose material connections with affiliate links.306
CONCLUSION
With the influencer marketing industry growing exponentially, it
is critical that the FTC makes it clear to influencers, affiliate
networks, and brands alike that disclosure of material connections
is nonnegotiable. The FTC’s guidance provides ample public notice
and opportunity for voluntary compliance with endorsement dis-
closure requirements.307 Yet, the noncompliance of individual influ-
encers and affiliate networks with affiliate link disclosure require-
ments continues at an alarming rate and escapes FTC scrutiny.308
301. See supra note 179 and accompanying text.
302. Bryan Boy (@bryanboy), TWITTER (May 13, 2017, 7:43 AM), https://twitter.com/
bryanboy/status/863404332502220800 [https://perma.cc/6L3M-H9HK] (“Why am I the only
one disclosing my travels are subsidized for and or I’m being #sponsored? Why! I mean. This
is just ridiculous.”); Bryan Boy (@bryanboy), TWITTER (Feb. 5, 2017, 3:15 PM), https://twitter.
com/bryanboy/status/828381582109110276 [https://perma.cc/3AGH-A62N] (“I think it’s
important to own up for what we are. I make a living via paid endorsements.”).
303. See supra notes 175-76 and accompanying text.
304. See supra notes 177-78 and accompanying text.
305. See supra Part IV.A.
306. See UPDATED: Why Does the FTC Keep Ignoring Endorsement Violations?, FASHION
L. (Dec. 15, 2015), http://www.thefashionlaw.com/home/why-does-the-ftc-keep-ignoring-endors
Ement-violations?rq=Why%20Does%20the%20FTC%20Keep%20Ignoring%20Endorse
ment%20Violations [https://perma.cc/7RC7-W7LD] (“The FTC is either not getting its message
out in a sufficient manner or [influencers] ... are simply disregarding them.”).
307. See supra Part II.B.
308. See supra Parts I.C, III.B.1.
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The proposed multipronged enforcement approach leverages the
FTC’s enforcement discretion to give greater authority to the ex-
isting FTC guidance on endorsements.309 By pursuing enforcement
against selected influencers and affiliate networks, the FTC can
seek consent orders that set the industry standard for clear and
conspicuous disclosures of affiliate links and effective influencer
monitoring programs.310 This approach maximizes the FTC’s limited
resources by targeting the least cost avoiders to increase compli-
ance with endorsement disclosure requirements, thus allowing
consumers to effectively evaluate influencer endorsements.
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